Push old Amlogic BL2 sourcesHEADmaster

1 files changed, 593 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a6913a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,593 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2014, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
+ * list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
+ * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
+ * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * Neither the name of ARM nor the names of its contributors may be used
+ * to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
+ * prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a
+ * plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The
+ * SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that
+ * executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting
+ * the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either
+ * handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also
+ * responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <bl_common.h>
+#include <bl31.h>
+#include <context_mgmt.h>
+#include <debug.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <platform.h>
+#include <runtime_svc.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <tsp.h>
+#include <uuid.h>
+#include "tspd_private.h"
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Address of the entrypoint vector table in the Secure Payload. It is
+ * initialised once on the primary core after a cold boot.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+tsp_vectors_t *tsp_vectors;
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Array to keep track of per-cpu Secure Payload state
+ ******************************************************************************/
+tsp_context_t tspd_sp_context[TSPD_CORE_COUNT];
+
+
+/* TSP UID */
+DEFINE_SVC_UUID(tsp_uuid,
+		0x5b3056a0, 0x3291, 0x427b, 0x98, 0x11,
+		0x71, 0x68, 0xca, 0x50, 0xf3, 0xfa);
+
+int32_t tspd_init(void);
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function is the handler registered for S-EL1 interrupts by the TSPD. It
+ * validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into the TSP at
+ * 'tsp_fiq_entry()' for handling the interrupt.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static uint64_t tspd_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id,
+					    uint32_t flags,
+					    void *handle,
+					    void *cookie)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id;
+	uint64_t mpidr;
+	tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx;
+
+	/* Check the security state when the exception was generated */
+	assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE);
+
+#if IMF_READ_INTERRUPT_ID
+	/* Check the security status of the interrupt */
+	assert(plat_ic_get_interrupt_type(id) == INTR_TYPE_S_EL1);
+#endif
+
+	/* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */
+	mpidr = read_mpidr();
+	assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE));
+
+	/* Save the non-secure context before entering the TSP */
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
+
+	/* Get a reference to this cpu's TSP context */
+	linear_id = platform_get_core_pos(mpidr);
+	tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id];
+	assert(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(mpidr, SECURE));
+
+	/*
+	 * Determine if the TSP was previously preempted. Its last known
+	 * context has to be preserved in this case.
+	 * The TSP should return control to the TSPD after handling this
+	 * FIQ. Preserve essential EL3 context to allow entry into the
+	 * TSP at the FIQ entry point using the 'cpu_context' structure.
+	 * There is no need to save the secure system register context
+	 * since the TSP is supposed to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt
+	 * handling.
+	 */
+	if (get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) {
+		tsp_ctx->saved_spsr_el3 = SMC_GET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
+						      CTX_SPSR_EL3);
+		tsp_ctx->saved_elr_el3 = SMC_GET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
+						     CTX_ELR_EL3);
+	}
+
+	SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
+		    CTX_SPSR_EL3,
+		    SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, MODE_SP_ELX, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS));
+	SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
+		    CTX_ELR_EL3,
+		    (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->fiq_entry);
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
+	cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Tell the TSP that it has to handle an FIQ synchronously. Also the
+	 * instruction in normal world where the interrupt was generated is
+	 * passed for debugging purposes. It is safe to retrieve this address
+	 * from ELR_EL3 as the secure context will not take effect until
+	 * el3_exit().
+	 */
+	SMC_RET2(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, TSP_HANDLE_FIQ_AND_RETURN, read_elr_el3());
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Secure Payload Dispatcher setup. The SPD finds out the SP entrypoint and type
+ * (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry
+ * into the SP for its initialisation.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int32_t tspd_setup(void)
+{
+	entry_point_info_t *image_info;
+	int32_t rc;
+	uint64_t mpidr = read_mpidr();
+	uint32_t linear_id;
+
+	linear_id = platform_get_core_pos(mpidr);
+
+	/*
+	 * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its
+	 * absence is a critical failure.  TODO: Add support to
+	 * conditionally include the SPD service
+	 */
+	image_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE);
+	assert(image_info);
+
+	/*
+	 * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value
+	 * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without
+	 * registering any handlers
+	 */
+	if (!image_info->pc)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * We could inspect the SP image and determine it's execution
+	 * state i.e whether AArch32 or AArch64. Assuming it's AArch64
+	 * for the time being.
+	 */
+	rc = tspd_init_secure_context(image_info->pc,
+				     TSP_AARCH64,
+				     mpidr,
+				     &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]);
+	assert(rc == 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * All TSPD initialization done. Now register our init function with
+	 * BL31 for deferred invocation
+	 */
+	bl31_register_bl32_init(&tspd_init);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function passes control to the Secure Payload image (BL32) for the first
+ * time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure
+ * context has already been created by tspd_setup() which can be directly used.
+ * It also assumes that a valid non-secure context has been initialised by PSCI
+ * so it does not need to save and restore any non-secure state. This function
+ * performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload. The SP passes control
+ * back to this routine through a SMC.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int32_t tspd_init(void)
+{
+	uint64_t mpidr = read_mpidr();
+	uint32_t linear_id = platform_get_core_pos(mpidr), flags;
+	uint64_t rc;
+	tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id];
+
+	/*
+	 * Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload. We expect an array
+	 * of vectors in return
+	 */
+	rc = tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx);
+	assert(rc != 0);
+	if (rc) {
+		set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_ON);
+
+		/*
+		 * TSP has been successfully initialized. Register power
+		 * managemnt hooks with PSCI
+		 */
+		psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&tspd_pm);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts when generated
+	 * during code executing in the non-secure state.
+	 */
+	flags = 0;
+	set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
+	rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1,
+					     tspd_sel1_interrupt_handler,
+					     flags);
+	if (rc)
+		panic();
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App
+ * range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention
+ * Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure payload
+ * to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it
+ * will also return any information that the secure payload needs to do the
+ * work assigned to it.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+uint64_t tspd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
+			 uint64_t x1,
+			 uint64_t x2,
+			 uint64_t x3,
+			 uint64_t x4,
+			 void *cookie,
+			 void *handle,
+			 uint64_t flags)
+{
+	cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context;
+	unsigned long mpidr = read_mpidr();
+	uint32_t linear_id = platform_get_core_pos(mpidr), ns;
+	tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id];
+
+	/* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
+	ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags);
+
+	switch (smc_fid) {
+
+	/*
+	 * This function ID is used by TSP to indicate that it was
+	 * preempted by a normal world IRQ.
+	 *
+	 */
+	case TSP_PREEMPTED:
+		if (ns)
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+		assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, SECURE));
+		cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
+		/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
+		ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE);
+		assert(ns_cpu_context);
+
+		/*
+		 * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the
+		 * secure system register context since the TSP was supposed
+		 * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling.
+		 */
+		cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
+		cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
+
+		SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, SMC_PREEMPTED);
+
+	/*
+	 * This function ID is used only by the TSP to indicate that it has
+	 * finished handling a S-EL1 FIQ interrupt. Execution should resume
+	 * in the normal world.
+	 */
+	case TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_FIQ:
+		if (ns)
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+		assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, SECURE));
+
+		/*
+		 * Restore the relevant EL3 state which saved to service
+		 * this SMC.
+		 */
+		if (get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) {
+			SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
+				    CTX_SPSR_EL3,
+				    tsp_ctx->saved_spsr_el3);
+			SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
+				    CTX_ELR_EL3,
+				    tsp_ctx->saved_elr_el3);
+		}
+
+		/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
+		ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE);
+		assert(ns_cpu_context);
+
+		/*
+		 * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the
+		 * secure system register context since the TSP was supposed
+		 * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling.
+		 */
+		cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
+		cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
+
+		SMC_RET0((uint64_t) ns_cpu_context);
+
+
+	/*
+	 * This function ID is used only by the TSP to indicate that it was
+	 * interrupted due to a EL3 FIQ interrupt. Execution should resume
+	 * in the normal world.
+	 */
+	case TSP_EL3_FIQ:
+		if (ns)
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+		assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, SECURE));
+
+		/* Assert that standard SMC execution has been preempted */
+		assert(get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state));
+
+		/* Save the secure system register state */
+		cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
+
+		/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
+		ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE);
+		assert(ns_cpu_context);
+
+		/* Restore non-secure state */
+		cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
+		cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
+
+		SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, TSP_EL3_FIQ);
+
+
+	/*
+	 * This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has
+	 * finished initialising itself after a cold boot
+	 */
+	case TSP_ENTRY_DONE:
+		if (ns)
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+		/*
+		 * Stash the SP entry points information. This is done
+		 * only once on the primary cpu
+		 */
+		assert(tsp_vectors == NULL);
+		tsp_vectors = (tsp_vectors_t *) x1;
+
+		/*
+		 * SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated
+		 * the original request through a synchronous entry
+		 * into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime
+		 * context.
+		 */
+		tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_ctx, x1);
+
+	/*
+	 * These function IDs is used only by the SP to indicate it has
+	 * finished:
+	 * 1. turning itself on in response to an earlier psci
+	 *    cpu_on request
+	 * 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
+	 *    request.
+	 */
+	case TSP_ON_DONE:
+	case TSP_RESUME_DONE:
+
+	/*
+	 * These function IDs is used only by the SP to indicate it has
+	 * finished:
+	 * 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
+	 *    request.
+	 * 2. turning itself off in response to an earlier psci
+	 *    cpu_off request.
+	 */
+	case TSP_OFF_DONE:
+	case TSP_SUSPEND_DONE:
+		if (ns)
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+		/*
+		 * SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated the
+		 * original request through a synchronous entry into the SP.
+		 * Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as
+		 * return value to the caller
+		 */
+		tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_ctx, x1);
+
+		/*
+		 * Request from non-secure client to perform an
+		 * arithmetic operation or response from secure
+		 * payload to an earlier request.
+		 */
+	case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_ADD):
+	case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_SUB):
+	case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_MUL):
+	case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_DIV):
+
+	case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_ADD):
+	case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_SUB):
+	case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_MUL):
+	case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_DIV):
+		if (ns) {
+			/*
+			 * This is a fresh request from the non-secure client.
+			 * The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which
+			 * registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure
+			 * state and send the request to the secure payload.
+			 */
+			assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE));
+
+			/* Check if we are already preempted */
+			if (get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state))
+				SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+			cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
+
+			/* Save x1 and x2 for use by TSP_GET_ARGS call below */
+			store_tsp_args(tsp_ctx, x1, x2);
+
+			/*
+			 * We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the
+			 * secure payload to do the work now.
+			 */
+
+			/*
+			 * Verify if there is a valid context to use, copy the
+			 * operation type and parameters to the secure context
+			 * and jump to the fast smc entry point in the secure
+			 * payload. Entry into S-EL1 will take place upon exit
+			 * from this function.
+			 */
+			assert(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(mpidr, SECURE));
+
+			/* Set appropriate entry for SMC.
+			 * We expect the TSP to manage the PSTATE.I and PSTATE.F
+			 * flags as appropriate.
+			 */
+			if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_FAST) {
+				cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t)
+						&tsp_vectors->fast_smc_entry);
+			} else {
+				set_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state);
+				cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t)
+						&tsp_vectors->std_smc_entry);
+			}
+
+			cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
+			cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
+			SMC_RET3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, smc_fid, x1, x2);
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * This is the result from the secure client of an
+			 * earlier request. The results are in x1-x3. Copy it
+			 * into the non-secure context, save the secure state
+			 * and return to the non-secure state.
+			 */
+			assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, SECURE));
+			cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
+
+			/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
+			ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE);
+			assert(ns_cpu_context);
+
+			/* Restore non-secure state */
+			cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
+			cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
+			if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_STD)
+				clr_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state);
+			SMC_RET3(ns_cpu_context, x1, x2, x3);
+		}
+
+		break;
+
+		/*
+		 * Request from non secure world to resume the preempted
+		 * Standard SMC call.
+		 */
+	case TSP_FID_RESUME:
+		/* RESUME should be invoked only by normal world */
+		if (!ns) {
+			assert(0);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * This is a resume request from the non-secure client.
+		 * save the non-secure state and send the request to
+		 * the secure payload.
+		 */
+		assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE));
+
+		/* Check if we are already preempted before resume */
+		if (!get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state))
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+		cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
+
+		/*
+		 * We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the
+		 * secure payload to do the work now.
+		 */
+
+		/* We just need to return to the preempted point in
+		 * TSP and the execution will resume as normal.
+		 */
+		cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
+		cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
+		SMC_RET0(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx);
+
+		/*
+		 * This is a request from the secure payload for more arguments
+		 * for an ongoing arithmetic operation requested by the
+		 * non-secure world. Simply return the arguments from the non-
+		 * secure client in the original call.
+		 */
+	case TSP_GET_ARGS:
+		if (ns)
+			SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+		get_tsp_args(tsp_ctx, x1, x2);
+		SMC_RET2(handle, x1, x2);
+
+	case TOS_CALL_COUNT:
+		/*
+		 * Return the number of service function IDs implemented to
+		 * provide service to non-secure
+		 */
+		SMC_RET1(handle, TSP_NUM_FID);
+
+	case TOS_UID:
+		/* Return TSP UID to the caller */
+		SMC_UUID_RET(handle, tsp_uuid);
+
+	case TOS_CALL_VERSION:
+		/* Return the version of current implementation */
+		SMC_RET2(handle, TSP_VERSION_MAJOR, TSP_VERSION_MINOR);
+
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+}
+
+/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */
+DECLARE_RT_SVC(
+	tspd_fast,
+
+	OEN_TOS_START,
+	OEN_TOS_END,
+	SMC_TYPE_FAST,
+	tspd_setup,
+	tspd_smc_handler
+);
+
+/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for standard SMC calls */
+DECLARE_RT_SVC(
+	tspd_std,
+
+	OEN_TOS_START,
+	OEN_TOS_END,
+	SMC_TYPE_STD,
+	NULL,
+	tspd_smc_handler
+);