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Diffstat (limited to 'services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c')
-rw-r--r--services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c593
1 files changed, 593 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a6913a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/spd/tspd/tspd_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,593 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2014, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *
+ * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
+ * list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice,
+ * this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation
+ * and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * Neither the name of ARM nor the names of its contributors may be used
+ * to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
+ * prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a
+ * plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The
+ * SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that
+ * executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting
+ * the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either
+ * handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also
+ * responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <bl_common.h>
+#include <bl31.h>
+#include <context_mgmt.h>
+#include <debug.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <platform.h>
+#include <runtime_svc.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <tsp.h>
+#include <uuid.h>
+#include "tspd_private.h"
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Address of the entrypoint vector table in the Secure Payload. It is
+ * initialised once on the primary core after a cold boot.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+tsp_vectors_t *tsp_vectors;
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Array to keep track of per-cpu Secure Payload state
+ ******************************************************************************/
+tsp_context_t tspd_sp_context[TSPD_CORE_COUNT];
+
+
+/* TSP UID */
+DEFINE_SVC_UUID(tsp_uuid,
+ 0x5b3056a0, 0x3291, 0x427b, 0x98, 0x11,
+ 0x71, 0x68, 0xca, 0x50, 0xf3, 0xfa);
+
+int32_t tspd_init(void);
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function is the handler registered for S-EL1 interrupts by the TSPD. It
+ * validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into the TSP at
+ * 'tsp_fiq_entry()' for handling the interrupt.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static uint64_t tspd_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id,
+ uint32_t flags,
+ void *handle,
+ void *cookie)
+{
+ uint32_t linear_id;
+ uint64_t mpidr;
+ tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx;
+
+ /* Check the security state when the exception was generated */
+ assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE);
+
+#if IMF_READ_INTERRUPT_ID
+ /* Check the security status of the interrupt */
+ assert(plat_ic_get_interrupt_type(id) == INTR_TYPE_S_EL1);
+#endif
+
+ /* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */
+ mpidr = read_mpidr();
+ assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE));
+
+ /* Save the non-secure context before entering the TSP */
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
+
+ /* Get a reference to this cpu's TSP context */
+ linear_id = platform_get_core_pos(mpidr);
+ tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id];
+ assert(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(mpidr, SECURE));
+
+ /*
+ * Determine if the TSP was previously preempted. Its last known
+ * context has to be preserved in this case.
+ * The TSP should return control to the TSPD after handling this
+ * FIQ. Preserve essential EL3 context to allow entry into the
+ * TSP at the FIQ entry point using the 'cpu_context' structure.
+ * There is no need to save the secure system register context
+ * since the TSP is supposed to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt
+ * handling.
+ */
+ if (get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) {
+ tsp_ctx->saved_spsr_el3 = SMC_GET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
+ CTX_SPSR_EL3);
+ tsp_ctx->saved_elr_el3 = SMC_GET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
+ CTX_ELR_EL3);
+ }
+
+ SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
+ CTX_SPSR_EL3,
+ SPSR_64(MODE_EL1, MODE_SP_ELX, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS));
+ SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
+ CTX_ELR_EL3,
+ (uint64_t) &tsp_vectors->fiq_entry);
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
+ cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
+
+ /*
+ * Tell the TSP that it has to handle an FIQ synchronously. Also the
+ * instruction in normal world where the interrupt was generated is
+ * passed for debugging purposes. It is safe to retrieve this address
+ * from ELR_EL3 as the secure context will not take effect until
+ * el3_exit().
+ */
+ SMC_RET2(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, TSP_HANDLE_FIQ_AND_RETURN, read_elr_el3());
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Secure Payload Dispatcher setup. The SPD finds out the SP entrypoint and type
+ * (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry
+ * into the SP for its initialisation.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int32_t tspd_setup(void)
+{
+ entry_point_info_t *image_info;
+ int32_t rc;
+ uint64_t mpidr = read_mpidr();
+ uint32_t linear_id;
+
+ linear_id = platform_get_core_pos(mpidr);
+
+ /*
+ * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its
+ * absence is a critical failure. TODO: Add support to
+ * conditionally include the SPD service
+ */
+ image_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE);
+ assert(image_info);
+
+ /*
+ * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value
+ * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without
+ * registering any handlers
+ */
+ if (!image_info->pc)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * We could inspect the SP image and determine it's execution
+ * state i.e whether AArch32 or AArch64. Assuming it's AArch64
+ * for the time being.
+ */
+ rc = tspd_init_secure_context(image_info->pc,
+ TSP_AARCH64,
+ mpidr,
+ &tspd_sp_context[linear_id]);
+ assert(rc == 0);
+
+ /*
+ * All TSPD initialization done. Now register our init function with
+ * BL31 for deferred invocation
+ */
+ bl31_register_bl32_init(&tspd_init);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function passes control to the Secure Payload image (BL32) for the first
+ * time on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure
+ * context has already been created by tspd_setup() which can be directly used.
+ * It also assumes that a valid non-secure context has been initialised by PSCI
+ * so it does not need to save and restore any non-secure state. This function
+ * performs a synchronous entry into the Secure payload. The SP passes control
+ * back to this routine through a SMC.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int32_t tspd_init(void)
+{
+ uint64_t mpidr = read_mpidr();
+ uint32_t linear_id = platform_get_core_pos(mpidr), flags;
+ uint64_t rc;
+ tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id];
+
+ /*
+ * Arrange for an entry into the test secure payload. We expect an array
+ * of vectors in return
+ */
+ rc = tspd_synchronous_sp_entry(tsp_ctx);
+ assert(rc != 0);
+ if (rc) {
+ set_tsp_pstate(tsp_ctx->state, TSP_PSTATE_ON);
+
+ /*
+ * TSP has been successfully initialized. Register power
+ * managemnt hooks with PSCI
+ */
+ psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&tspd_pm);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts when generated
+ * during code executing in the non-secure state.
+ */
+ flags = 0;
+ set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
+ rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1,
+ tspd_sel1_interrupt_handler,
+ flags);
+ if (rc)
+ panic();
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App
+ * range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention
+ * Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure payload
+ * to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure state. Lastly it
+ * will also return any information that the secure payload needs to do the
+ * work assigned to it.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+uint64_t tspd_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
+ uint64_t x1,
+ uint64_t x2,
+ uint64_t x3,
+ uint64_t x4,
+ void *cookie,
+ void *handle,
+ uint64_t flags)
+{
+ cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context;
+ unsigned long mpidr = read_mpidr();
+ uint32_t linear_id = platform_get_core_pos(mpidr), ns;
+ tsp_context_t *tsp_ctx = &tspd_sp_context[linear_id];
+
+ /* Determine which security state this SMC originated from */
+ ns = is_caller_non_secure(flags);
+
+ switch (smc_fid) {
+
+ /*
+ * This function ID is used by TSP to indicate that it was
+ * preempted by a normal world IRQ.
+ *
+ */
+ case TSP_PREEMPTED:
+ if (ns)
+ SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+ assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, SECURE));
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
+ /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
+ ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE);
+ assert(ns_cpu_context);
+
+ /*
+ * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the
+ * secure system register context since the TSP was supposed
+ * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling.
+ */
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
+ cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
+
+ SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, SMC_PREEMPTED);
+
+ /*
+ * This function ID is used only by the TSP to indicate that it has
+ * finished handling a S-EL1 FIQ interrupt. Execution should resume
+ * in the normal world.
+ */
+ case TSP_HANDLED_S_EL1_FIQ:
+ if (ns)
+ SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+ assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, SECURE));
+
+ /*
+ * Restore the relevant EL3 state which saved to service
+ * this SMC.
+ */
+ if (get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state)) {
+ SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
+ CTX_SPSR_EL3,
+ tsp_ctx->saved_spsr_el3);
+ SMC_SET_EL3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx,
+ CTX_ELR_EL3,
+ tsp_ctx->saved_elr_el3);
+ }
+
+ /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
+ ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE);
+ assert(ns_cpu_context);
+
+ /*
+ * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the
+ * secure system register context since the TSP was supposed
+ * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling.
+ */
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
+ cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
+
+ SMC_RET0((uint64_t) ns_cpu_context);
+
+
+ /*
+ * This function ID is used only by the TSP to indicate that it was
+ * interrupted due to a EL3 FIQ interrupt. Execution should resume
+ * in the normal world.
+ */
+ case TSP_EL3_FIQ:
+ if (ns)
+ SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+ assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, SECURE));
+
+ /* Assert that standard SMC execution has been preempted */
+ assert(get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state));
+
+ /* Save the secure system register state */
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
+
+ /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
+ ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE);
+ assert(ns_cpu_context);
+
+ /* Restore non-secure state */
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
+ cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
+
+ SMC_RET1(ns_cpu_context, TSP_EL3_FIQ);
+
+
+ /*
+ * This function ID is used only by the SP to indicate it has
+ * finished initialising itself after a cold boot
+ */
+ case TSP_ENTRY_DONE:
+ if (ns)
+ SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+ /*
+ * Stash the SP entry points information. This is done
+ * only once on the primary cpu
+ */
+ assert(tsp_vectors == NULL);
+ tsp_vectors = (tsp_vectors_t *) x1;
+
+ /*
+ * SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated
+ * the original request through a synchronous entry
+ * into the SP. Jump back to the original C runtime
+ * context.
+ */
+ tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_ctx, x1);
+
+ /*
+ * These function IDs is used only by the SP to indicate it has
+ * finished:
+ * 1. turning itself on in response to an earlier psci
+ * cpu_on request
+ * 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
+ * request.
+ */
+ case TSP_ON_DONE:
+ case TSP_RESUME_DONE:
+
+ /*
+ * These function IDs is used only by the SP to indicate it has
+ * finished:
+ * 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
+ * request.
+ * 2. turning itself off in response to an earlier psci
+ * cpu_off request.
+ */
+ case TSP_OFF_DONE:
+ case TSP_SUSPEND_DONE:
+ if (ns)
+ SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+ /*
+ * SP reports completion. The SPD must have initiated the
+ * original request through a synchronous entry into the SP.
+ * Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as
+ * return value to the caller
+ */
+ tspd_synchronous_sp_exit(tsp_ctx, x1);
+
+ /*
+ * Request from non-secure client to perform an
+ * arithmetic operation or response from secure
+ * payload to an earlier request.
+ */
+ case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_ADD):
+ case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_SUB):
+ case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_MUL):
+ case TSP_FAST_FID(TSP_DIV):
+
+ case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_ADD):
+ case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_SUB):
+ case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_MUL):
+ case TSP_STD_FID(TSP_DIV):
+ if (ns) {
+ /*
+ * This is a fresh request from the non-secure client.
+ * The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which
+ * registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure
+ * state and send the request to the secure payload.
+ */
+ assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE));
+
+ /* Check if we are already preempted */
+ if (get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state))
+ SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
+
+ /* Save x1 and x2 for use by TSP_GET_ARGS call below */
+ store_tsp_args(tsp_ctx, x1, x2);
+
+ /*
+ * We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the
+ * secure payload to do the work now.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * Verify if there is a valid context to use, copy the
+ * operation type and parameters to the secure context
+ * and jump to the fast smc entry point in the secure
+ * payload. Entry into S-EL1 will take place upon exit
+ * from this function.
+ */
+ assert(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(mpidr, SECURE));
+
+ /* Set appropriate entry for SMC.
+ * We expect the TSP to manage the PSTATE.I and PSTATE.F
+ * flags as appropriate.
+ */
+ if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_FAST) {
+ cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t)
+ &tsp_vectors->fast_smc_entry);
+ } else {
+ set_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state);
+ cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t)
+ &tsp_vectors->std_smc_entry);
+ }
+
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
+ cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
+ SMC_RET3(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx, smc_fid, x1, x2);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * This is the result from the secure client of an
+ * earlier request. The results are in x1-x3. Copy it
+ * into the non-secure context, save the secure state
+ * and return to the non-secure state.
+ */
+ assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, SECURE));
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
+
+ /* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
+ ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE);
+ assert(ns_cpu_context);
+
+ /* Restore non-secure state */
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
+ cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
+ if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_STD)
+ clr_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state);
+ SMC_RET3(ns_cpu_context, x1, x2, x3);
+ }
+
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * Request from non secure world to resume the preempted
+ * Standard SMC call.
+ */
+ case TSP_FID_RESUME:
+ /* RESUME should be invoked only by normal world */
+ if (!ns) {
+ assert(0);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This is a resume request from the non-secure client.
+ * save the non-secure state and send the request to
+ * the secure payload.
+ */
+ assert(handle == cm_get_context(mpidr, NON_SECURE));
+
+ /* Check if we are already preempted before resume */
+ if (!get_std_smc_active_flag(tsp_ctx->state))
+ SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
+
+ /*
+ * We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the
+ * secure payload to do the work now.
+ */
+
+ /* We just need to return to the preempted point in
+ * TSP and the execution will resume as normal.
+ */
+ cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
+ cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
+ SMC_RET0(&tsp_ctx->cpu_ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * This is a request from the secure payload for more arguments
+ * for an ongoing arithmetic operation requested by the
+ * non-secure world. Simply return the arguments from the non-
+ * secure client in the original call.
+ */
+ case TSP_GET_ARGS:
+ if (ns)
+ SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+
+ get_tsp_args(tsp_ctx, x1, x2);
+ SMC_RET2(handle, x1, x2);
+
+ case TOS_CALL_COUNT:
+ /*
+ * Return the number of service function IDs implemented to
+ * provide service to non-secure
+ */
+ SMC_RET1(handle, TSP_NUM_FID);
+
+ case TOS_UID:
+ /* Return TSP UID to the caller */
+ SMC_UUID_RET(handle, tsp_uuid);
+
+ case TOS_CALL_VERSION:
+ /* Return the version of current implementation */
+ SMC_RET2(handle, TSP_VERSION_MAJOR, TSP_VERSION_MINOR);
+
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ SMC_RET1(handle, SMC_UNK);
+}
+
+/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */
+DECLARE_RT_SVC(
+ tspd_fast,
+
+ OEN_TOS_START,
+ OEN_TOS_END,
+ SMC_TYPE_FAST,
+ tspd_setup,
+ tspd_smc_handler
+);
+
+/* Define a SPD runtime service descriptor for standard SMC calls */
+DECLARE_RT_SVC(
+ tspd_std,
+
+ OEN_TOS_START,
+ OEN_TOS_END,
+ SMC_TYPE_STD,
+ NULL,
+ tspd_smc_handler
+);